Savva, F. (2018) Strong implementation with partially honest individuals. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 78, pp. 27-34. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002)
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Abstract
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Savva, Foivos |
Authors: | Savva, F. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School |
Journal Name: | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
ISSN (Online): | 1873-1538 |
Published Online: | 17 July 2018 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2018 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 78: 27-34 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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