Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Savva, F. (2018) Strong implementation with partially honest individuals. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 78, pp. 27-34. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002)

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In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Savva, Foivos
Authors: Savva, F.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School
Journal Name:Journal of Mathematical Economics
ISSN (Online):1873-1538
Published Online:17 July 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Author
First Published:First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 78: 27-34
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
591544ESRC Doctoral Training Centre 2011...Mary Beth KneafseyEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC)ES/J500136/1VPO VICE PRINCIPAL RESEARCH & ENTERPRISE