Epistemic warrants and higher-order theories of conscious perception

Edwards, J. and Platchias, D. (2018) Epistemic warrants and higher-order theories of conscious perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99(2), pp. 343-364. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12161)

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We present a new account of perceptual consciousness, one which gives due weight to the epistemic commitment of normal perception in familiar circumstances. The account is given in terms of a higher‐order attitude for which the subject has an immediate perceptual epistemic warrant in the form of an appropriate first‐order perception. We develop our account in contrast to Rosenthal's higher‐order account, rejecting his view of consciousness in virtue of so‐called ‘targetless’ higher‐order states. We explain the key notion of an immediate perceptual warrant and show both that it requires the content of the higher‐order attitude to match that of the first‐order perception, and also that it gives a new perspective on the intimate relationship, rightly emphasised by Rosenthal, between consciousness and a subject's testimony as to ‘how it is with her’.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Edwards, Dr James and Platchias, Dr Dimitris
Authors: Edwards, J., and Platchias, D.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN (Online):1468-0114
Published Online:07 July 2016

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