Novel colour experiences and their implications

Macpherson, F. (2021) Novel colour experiences and their implications. In: Brown, D. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 175-209. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-15)

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This chapter explores the evidence for the existence of such new colour experiences and what their philosophical ramifications would be. It defines the notion of ‘novel colours’. The only things that, plausibly, might ‘forbid’ them are certain theories of colour—theories that rule out the existence of such colours or colour experiences. In more philosophical terminology, the judgements are based on the phenomenal character of the colour experience and on the phenomenal nature of the colours. According to the standard account of the colour, black and white appear to people to be opposites and not to contain any chromatic colour. Manzotti, R. argues that when the readers examine all the visual experiences that their ever have, perceptual, illusory, or hallucinatory, the readers cannot find one that isn’t composed of solely of the elements that their have experienced when seeing the world.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macpherson, Professor Fiona
Authors: Macpherson, F.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Published Online:28 September 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The contributor
First Published:First published in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour: 175-209
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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