Lazenby, H. and Gabriel, I. (2018) Permissible secrets. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(271), pp. 265-285. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqx044)
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Abstract
This article offers an account of the information condition on morally valid consent in the context of sexual relations. The account is grounded in rights. It holds that a person has a sufficient amount of information to give morally valid consent if, and only if, she has all the information to which she has a claim-right. A person has a claim-right to a piece of information if, and only if, a. it concerns a deal-breaker for her; b. it does not concern something that her partner has a strong interest in protecting from scrutiny, sufficient to generate a privilege-right; c.i. her partner is aware of the information to which her deal-breaker applies; or c.ii. her partner ought to be held responsible for the fact that he is not aware of the information to which her deal-breaker applies; and finally, d. she has not waived or forfeited her claim-right. Although we present this account in the context of sexual relations, we believe a virtue of the account is that it can be easily translated into other contexts.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lazenby, Dr Hugh |
Authors: | Lazenby, H., and Gabriel, I. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophical Quarterly |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 0031-8094 |
ISSN (Online): | 1467-9213 |
Published Online: | 13 September 2017 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2017 The Authors |
First Published: | First published in Philosophical Quarterly 2017 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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