Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control

Carter, J. A. (2018) Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control. Metaphilosophy, 49(3), pp. 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)

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Abstract

An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa’s (2017) recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa’s wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer 2012) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Pritchard 2010; Palermos 2014; Carter 2017).

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Metaphilosophy
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0026-1068
ISSN (Online):1467-9973
Published Online:16 April 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
First Published:First published in Metaphilosophy 49(3):283-304
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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