Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness

Cowan, R. (2018) Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness. In: Bergqvist, A. and Cowan, R. (eds.) Evaluative Perception. Series: Mind association occasional series. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198786054 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0012)

Abstract

Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential bases and justifications can be demanded of them. I respond to these objections whilst granting that emotions are reason-responsive. This is not only dialectically significant vis-à-vis the prospects for Epistemic Sentimentalism, but also supports a broader claim about the compatibility of a mental item’s being reason-responsive and its being a generative source of epistemic justification.

• Item Type: Book Sections
• Status: Published
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Cowan, Dr Robert
• Authors: Cowan, R.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General); B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology; B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BH Aesthetics; B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• ISBN: 9780198786054
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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