Kirsanova, T. , Machado, C. and Ribeiro, A. P. (2018) Should the ECB coordinate EMU fiscal policies? International Journal of Central Banking, 14(3), pp. 237-280.
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Publisher's URL: https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb18q2a5.htm
Abstract
In a monetary union where fiscal authorities act strategically, fiscal cooperation is unlikely to emerge as an equilibrium. Even when the cooperative outcome is the best for a national fiscal authority, it is either not a Nash equilibrium or only one of several Nash equilibriums. The monetary authority may have an important coordinating role; however, the Paretopreferred equilibrium will not necessarily involve cooperation.
| Item Type: | Articles |
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| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kirsanova, Professor Tatiana |
| Authors: | Kirsanova, T., Machado, C., and Ribeiro, A. P. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Central Banking |
| Publisher: | Federal Reserve Board |
| ISSN: | 1815-4654 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1815-7556 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2018 The Association of the International Journal of Central Banking |
| First Published: | First published in International Journal of Central Banking 14(3): 237-280 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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