Should the ECB coordinate EMU fiscal policies?

Kirsanova, T. , Machado, C. and Ribeiro, A. P. (2018) Should the ECB coordinate EMU fiscal policies? International Journal of Central Banking, 14(3), pp. 237-280.

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In a monetary union where fiscal authorities act strategically, fiscal cooperation is unlikely to emerge as an equilibrium. Even when the cooperative outcome is the best for a national fiscal authority, it is either not a Nash equilibrium or only one of several Nash equilibriums. The monetary authority may have an important coordinating role; however, the Paretopreferred equilibrium will not necessarily involve cooperation.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kirsanova, Professor Tatiana
Authors: Kirsanova, T., Machado, C., and Ribeiro, A. P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Central Banking
Publisher:Federal Reserve Board
ISSN (Online):1815-7556
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Association of the International Journal of Central Banking
First Published:First published in International Journal of Central Banking 14(3): 237-280
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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