Student-Project Allocation with Preferences over Projects

Manlove, D. F. and O'Malley, G. (2005) Student-Project Allocation with Preferences over Projects. In: Algorithms and Complexity in Durham 2005: Proceedings of the First ACiD Workshop, Durham, UK, 08-10 Jul 2005, pp. 69-80. ISBN 9781904987109

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We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this context we seek a stable matching of students to projects, which respects these preference and capacity constraints. Here, the stability definition generalises the corresponding notion in the context of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem. We show that stable matchings can have different sizes, and the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching is NP-hard, though approximable within a factor of 2.

Item Type:Conference Proceedings
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Professor David and O'Malley, Dr Gregg
Authors: Manlove, D. F., and O'Malley, G.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2005 The Authors
First Published:First published in Algorithms and Complexity in Durham 2005: Proceedings of the First ACiD Workshop: 69-80
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
320021Algorithmics of Stable Matching Problems with IndifferenceDavid ManloveEngineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)GR/R84597/01COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE