Epiphenomenal properties

Baysan, U. (2018) Epiphenomenal properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), pp. 419-431. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1366534)

[img]
Preview
Text
145430.pdf - Accepted Version

394kB

Abstract

What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we can decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterization of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal, because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these similarities figure as powers in the causal profiles of these properties.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Baysan, Dr Emin
Authors: Baysan, U.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:0004-8402
ISSN (Online):1471-6828
Published Online:21 August 2017
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(3): 419-431
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record