Pettigrove, G. and Collins, J. (2011) Apologizing for who I am. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 28(2), pp. 137-150. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00519.x)
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Abstract
Philosophical discussions of apologies have focused on apologizing for wrong actions. Such a focus overlooks an important dimension of moral failures, namely, failures of character. However, when one attempts to revise the standard account of apology to make room for failures of character, two objections emerge. The first is rooted in the psychology of shame. The second stems from the purported social function of apologies. This paper responds to these objections and, in so doing, sheds further light both on why we apologize (when we are in the wrong) and on why we accept apologies (when others are).
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pettigrove, Professor Glen |
| Authors: | Pettigrove, G., and Collins, J. |
| College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0264-3758 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-5930 |
| Published Online: | 18 February 2011 |
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