Pettigrove, G. (2011) Is virtue ethics self-effacing? Journal of Ethics, 15(3), pp. 191-207. (doi: 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4)
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Abstract
Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pettigrove, Professor Glen |
Authors: | Pettigrove, G. |
College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Journal of Ethics |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 1382-4554 |
ISSN (Online): | 1572-8609 |
Published Online: | 16 October 2010 |
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