Is virtue ethics self-effacing?

Pettigrove, G. (2011) Is virtue ethics self-effacing? Journal of Ethics, 15(3), pp. 191-207. (doi: 10.1007/s10892-010-9089-4)

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Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Ethics
ISSN (Online):1572-8609
Published Online:16 October 2010

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