Pettigrove, G. (2012) Meekness and ‘moral’ anger. Ethics, 122(2), pp. 341-370. (doi: 10.1086/663230)
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Abstract
If asked to generate a list of virtues, most people would not include meekness. So it is surprising that Hume deems it not only a virtue, but one whose “tendency to the good of society no one can doubt of.” After explaining what Hume and his contemporaries meant by ‘meekness’, the essay proceeds to argue that meekness is a virtue we, too, should endorse.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pettigrove, Professor Glen |
| Authors: | Pettigrove, G. |
| College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Ethics |
| Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
| ISSN: | 0014-1704 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1539-297X |
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