Contributions by interest groups to lobbying coalitions

Heaney, M. T. and Leifeld, P. (2018) Contributions by interest groups to lobbying coalitions. Journal of Politics, 80(2), pp. 494-509. (doi: 10.1086/694545)

141295.pdf - Accepted Version



Decisions by interest groups about when and how to work together inside coalitions are critical components of interest group strategies. This article argues that the composition of lobbying coalitions is a key factor that relates to these decisions. First, partisan diversity within a coalition may enhance contributions from groups if bipartisanship is seen as a positive signal of the coalition’s likely success. Second, network embeddedness may enhance contributions from coalition members if concomitant relationships make it easier to collaborate. Using a two-mode exponential random graph model with structural zeros, the study draws on interviews with congressional staff members, interest group representatives, and coalition representatives working on health policy in the United States. The results demonstrate a robust, positive association of partisan diversity with contributions by interest groups to lobbying coalitions. The results also reveal positive correspondence with network embeddedness, although these results are contingent on model specification.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Leifeld, Professor Philip and Heaney, Dr Michael
Authors: Heaney, M. T., and Leifeld, P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences
Journal Name:Journal of Politics
Publisher:University of Chicago Press
ISSN (Online):1468-2508
Published Online:20 February 2018
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2018 The Southern Political Science Association
First Published:First published in Journal of Politics 80(2):494-509
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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