Anger and moral judgment

Pettigrove, G. and Tanaka, K. (2014) Anger and moral judgment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(2), pp. 269-286. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.795990)

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Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, Śāntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) wrongs. Nevertheless, we argue, they remain capable of judging such actions to be wrong. This indicates that a different account of the relationship between anger and moral judgment is required. We conclude by proposing one such account, showing how a metaethicist who was more attentive to the normative ethics of anger might set about reconstructing her position.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pettigrove, Professor Glen
Authors: Pettigrove, G., and Tanaka, K.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
ISSN (Online):1471-6828
Published Online:10 May 2013

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