Criticism and blame in action and assertion

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

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In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona and Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C., and Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Journal of Philosophy
ISSN (Online):1939-8549
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
First Published:First published in Journal of Philosophy 114(2):76-93
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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