Lotteries and justification

Kelp, C. (2017) Lotteries and justification. Synthese, 194(4), pp. 1233-1244. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0989-5)

Abstract

The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: (i) highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, (ii) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, (iii) known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject (i) as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either (ii) or (iii) and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: This work was funded by grants from KU Leuven’s Special Research Fund (BOF) and Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kelp, Professor Christoph
• Authors: Kelp, C.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Synthese
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0964
• Published Online: 21 December 2015
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media
• First Published: First published in Synthese 194(4): 1233-1244
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy