Norms of belief

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

140968.pdf - Accepted Version



When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph and Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M., Kelp, C., and Ghijsen, H.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
Published Online:22 October 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
First Published:First published in Philosophical Issues 26: 374-392
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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