Justified belief: knowledge first-style

Kelp, C. (2016) Justified belief: knowledge first-style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(1), pp. 79-100. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12272)

140967.pdf - Accepted Version



Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:26 January 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
First Published:First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(1): 79-100
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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