Kelp, C. (2016) Justified belief: knowledge first-style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(1), pp. 79-100. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12272)
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Abstract
Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (Forthcoming a, b), Williamson (2000, 2010), a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar (2010) and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (2007). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
Authors: | Kelp, C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Publisher: | Wiley |
ISSN: | 0031-8205 |
ISSN (Online): | 1933-1592 |
Published Online: | 26 January 2016 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC |
First Published: | First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(1): 79-100 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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