Epistemic Frankfurt cases revisited

Kelp, C. (2016) Epistemic Frankfurt cases revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(1), pp. 27-37.

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Publisher's URL: http://apq.press.illinois.edu/53/1/kelp.html


In Kelp (2009a), it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake Barn cases, they generate a problem for the two most prominent virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge, due to Ernest Sosa and John Greco.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:American Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:University of Illinois Press
ISSN (Online):2152-1123
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
First Published:First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 53(1): 27-37
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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