Knowledge and approximate knowledge

Decock, L., Douven, I., Kelp, C. and Wenmackers, S. (2014) Knowledge and approximate knowledge. Erkenntnis, 79(S6), pp. 1129-1150. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9544-2)

140959.pdf - Accepted Version



Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one that allows us to stick to the orthodoxy. The alternative applies the conceptual spaces approach to the concept of knowledge. With knowledge conceived of spatially, the variability in knowledge attributions follows from recent work on identity, according to which our standards for judging things (including concepts) to be identical are context-dependent. On the proposal to be made, it depends on what is at stake in a context whether it is worth distinguishing between knowing and being at least close to knowing.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Decock, L., Douven, I., Kelp, C., and Wenmackers, S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
ISSN (Online):1572-8420
Published Online:01 November 2013
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Erkenntnis 79(S6): 1129-1150
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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