Knowledge, understanding, and virtue

Kelp, C. (2014) Knowledge, understanding, and virtue. In: Fairweather, A. (ed.) Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Series: Synthese Library (366). Springer: Cham ; Heidelberg ; New York, pp. 347-360. ISBN 9783319046716 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_20)

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In a number of recent pieces, Duncan Pritchard has used cases with the structure of Goldman’s infamous fake barn case to argue against (i) a promising virtue epistemological account of knowledge and (ii) a promising knowledge-based account of understanding. This paper aims to defend both of these views against Pritchard’s objections. More specifically, I outline two ways of resisting Pritchard’s objections. The first allows for knowledge in fake barn cases and explains the intuition of ignorance away. In contrast, the second response appeals to a plausible alternative account of understanding. Each of the resulting views is shown to be epistemologically viable and preferable to the alternative Pritchard’s offers.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy

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