Knowledge: the safe-apt view

Kelp, C. (2013) Knowledge: the safe-apt view. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 265-278. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.673726)

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According to virtue epistemology, knowledge involves cognitive success that is due to cognitive competence. This paper explores the prospects of a virtue theory of knowledge that, so far, has no takers in the literature. It combines features from a couple of different virtue theories: like Pritchard's [forthcoming; et al. 2010] view, it qualifies as what I call an ‘impure’ version of virtue epistemology, according to which the competence condition is supplemented by an additional (safety) condition; like Sosa's 2007, 2010 view, it construes the ‘because’ relation at issue in the competence condition in terms of competence manifestation. I argue that this virtue epistemology can steer clear of a number of old and new problems that arise for its rivals on both sides.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1471-6828
Published Online:20 April 2012
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Australasian Association of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 265-278
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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