Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology

Kelp, C. (2013) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 245-252. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9301-3)

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Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
ISSN (Online):1572-8420
Published Online:23 July 2011
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in Erkenntnis 78(2): 245-252
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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