Kelp, C. (2013) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 245-252. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9301-3)
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Abstract
Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
| Item Type: | Articles |
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| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
| Authors: | Kelp, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Erkenntnis |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0165-0106 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1572-8420 |
| Published Online: | 23 July 2011 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media |
| First Published: | First published in Erkenntnis 78(2): 245-252 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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