Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2012) In defense of the rational credibility account: a reply to Casalegno. Dialectica, 66(2), pp. 289-297. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x)
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Abstract
A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
| Authors: | Douven, I., and Kelp, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Dialectica |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0012-2017 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1746-8361 |
| Published Online: | 24 March 2012 |
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