Kelp, C. (2012) Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 513-521. (doi: 10.2143/TVF.74.3.2174107)
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Abstract
It has recently been argued that, contrary to first appearances, knowledge is not distinctively valuable. The argumentative strategy of value sceptics in epistemology is to identify a challenge that any satisfactory account of the distinctive value of knowledge will have to meet and to argue that no viable theory of knowledge does the job. This paper argues that the value sceptical argument is unsuccessful in that it does not establish that a virtue epistemological account of the value of knowledge fails.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kelp, Professor Christoph |
| Authors: | Kelp, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
| Publisher: | Peeters Publishers |
| ISSN: | 1370-575X |
| ISSN (Online): | 2031-8952 |
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