Sustaining a rational disagreement

Kelp, C. and Douven, I. (2012) Sustaining a rational disagreement. In: de Regt, H. W., Hartmann, S. and Okasha, S. (eds.) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Series: The European philosophy of Science Association proceedings (1). Springer: Dordrecht, pp. 101-110. ISBN 9789400724037 (doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_10)

140939.pdf - Accepted Version



Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kelp, Professor Christoph
Authors: Kelp, C., and Douven, I.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media
First Published:First published in EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009: 101-110
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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