Krämer, S. (2010) How not to defend ontological cheats. Analysis, 70(2), pp. 290-296. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anp162)
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Abstract
Jonathan Tallant (2009) argues against the view that ‘truth requires ground’ by trying to show that some theories which violate this principle are theoretically more virtuous than competitors respecting it, which gives us a good reason to reject the principle. I argue that Tallant’s argument is unsuccessful.
| Item Type: | Articles |
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| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kraemer, Dr Stephan |
| Authors: | Krämer, S. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Analysis |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press for Analysis Trust |
| ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-8284 |
| Published Online: | 16 December 2009 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2009 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in Analysis 70(2): 290-296 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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