Painfulness, desire, and the Euthyphro dilemma

Brady, M. S. (2018) Painfulness, desire, and the Euthyphro dilemma. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 239-250.

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The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M. S.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:American Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:University of Illinois Press
ISSN (Online):2152-1123
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2017 University of Illinois Press
First Published:First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 55(3): 239-250
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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