Painfulness, desire, and the Euthyphro dilemma

Brady, M. S. (2018) Painfulness, desire, and the Euthyphro dilemma. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3), pp. 239-250.

Abstract

The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Brady, Professor Michael
• Authors: Brady, M. S.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: American Philosophical Quarterly
• Publisher: University of Illinois Press
• ISSN: 0003-0481
• ISSN (Online): 2152-1123
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2017 University of Illinois Press
• First Published: First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 55(3): 239-250
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher