Rossian conceptual intuitionism

Cowan, R. (2017) Rossian conceptual intuitionism. Ethics, 127(4), pp. 821-851. (doi: 10.1086/691566)

Abstract

In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident (perhaps in an attenuated sense) may commit Rossians to radically expanding the scope of self-evidence.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Cowan, Dr Robert
• Authors: Cowan, R.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Ethics
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• ISSN: 0014-1704
• ISSN (Online): 1539-297X
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2017 The University of Chicago
• First Published: First published in Ethics 127(4):821-851
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher