Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2016) Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility. Logos and Episteme, 7(4), pp. 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)
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Abstract
This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Gordon, Dr Emma and Carter, Professor J Adam |
Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Gordon, E. C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Logos and Episteme |
Publisher: | Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy. |
ISSN: | 2069-0533 |
ISSN (Online): | 2069-3052 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 Logos and Episteme |
First Published: | First published in Logos and Episteme 7(4): 489-502 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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