Rieger, A. (2017) Was Quine right about subjunctive conditionals? Monist, 100(2), pp. 180-193. (doi: 10.1093/monist/onx003)
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Abstract
Given his hostility to intensional locutions, it is not surprising that Quine was suspicious of the subjunctive conditional. Although he admitted its usefulness as a heuristic device, in order to introduce dispositional terms, he held that it had no place in a finished scientific theory. In this paper I argue in support of something like Quine’s position. Many contemporary philosophers are unreflectively realist about subjunctives, regarding them as having objective truth values. I contest this. “Moderate realist” theorists, such as Lewis and Stalnaker, admit that subjunctives are context-relative and often indeterminate; I argue, using some examples from the contemporary literature on conditionals, that these features are deeper and more widespread than they think. “Ultra-realist” theories, which deny any indeterminacy, are not credible. Hence subjunctives are unsuitable for certain purposes, in particular the description of mind-independent reality.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Rieger, Dr Adam |
Authors: | Rieger, A. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Monist |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 0026-9662 |
ISSN (Online): | 2153-3601 |
Published Online: | 11 April 2017 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2017 The Authors |
First Published: | First published in Monist 100(2):180-193 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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