Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (2017) Googled assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 30(4), pp. 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)
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Abstract
Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Gordon, Dr Emma and Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Gordon, E. C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Psychology |
| Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
| ISSN: | 0951-5089 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1465-394X |
| Published Online: | 05 June 2017 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group |
| First Published: | First published in Philosophical Psychology 30(4):490-501 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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