Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015) Knowledge-how and epistemic value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), pp. 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)
|
Text
132199.pdf - Accepted Version 389kB |
Abstract
A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945; 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Pritchard, D. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BT Doctrinal Theology |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
| ISSN: | 0004-8402 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1471-6828 |
| Published Online: | 19 January 2015 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2015 Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| First Published: | First published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4): 799-816 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Altmetric
Altmetric