Carter, J. A. (2018) Meta-epistemic defeat. Synthese, 195(7), pp. 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)
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Abstract
An account of meta-epistemic defeaters—distinct from traditional (first-order) epistemic defeaters—is motivated and defended, drawing from case studies involving epistemic error-theory (e.g., Olson 2011, Reasons for belief; cf., Streumer 2012, J Philos 110:1–25) and epistemic relativism (e.g., MacFarlane 2005, Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:197–233; 2011; 2014, Assessment sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications). Mechanisms of traditional epistemic defeat and meta-epistemic defeat are compared and contrasted, and some new puzzles are introduced.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Carter, J. A. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Synthese |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1573-0964 |
| Published Online: | 29 August 2016 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in Synthese 195(7): 2877-2896 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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