Fischer, F. and Klimm, M. (2015) Optimal impartial selection. SIAM Journal on Computing, 44(5), pp. 1263-1285. (doi: 10.1137/140995775)
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Abstract
We study a fundamental problem in social choice theory, the selection of a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. Studied previously by Alon et al. [Proceedings of TARK, 2011, pp. 101--110] and by Holzman and Moulin [Econometrica, 81 (2013), pp. 173--196], this problem arises when representatives are selected from within a group or when publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. This is best possible subject to impartiality and resolves a conjecture of Alon et al. Further results are given for the case where some agent receives many nominations and the case where each agent casts at least one nomination.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Fischer, Dr Felix |
Authors: | Fischer, F., and Klimm, M. |
College/School: | College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science |
Journal Name: | SIAM Journal on Computing |
Publisher: | Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics |
ISSN: | 0097-5397 |
ISSN (Online): | 1095-7111 |
Published Online: | 20 October 2015 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2015 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics |
First Published: | First published in SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5): 1263-1285 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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