McDonnell, N. (2017) Causal exclusion and the limits of proportionality. Philosophical Studies, 174(6), pp. 1459-1474. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0767-3)
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Abstract
Causal exclusion arguments are taken to threaten the autonomy of the special sciences, and the causal efficacy of mental properties. A recent line of response to these arguments has appealed to “independently plausible” and “well grounded” theories of causation to rebut key premises. In this paper I consider two papers which proceed in this vein and show that they share a common feature: they both require causes to be proportional (in Yablo’s sense) to their effects. I argue that this feature is a bug, and one that generalises: any attempt to rescue the autonomy of the special sciences, or the efficacy of the mental, from exclusion worries had better not look to proportionality for help.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | McDonnell, Dr Neil |
| Authors: | McDonnell, N. |
| College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Studies |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0031-8116 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1573-0883 |
| Published Online: | 31 August 2016 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht |
| First Published: | First published in Philosophical Studies 174(6):1459–1474 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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