Self-referential propositions

Whittle, B. (2017) Self-referential propositions. Synthese, 194(12), pp. 5023-5037. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1191-0)

Abstract

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Whittle, Bruno
• Authors: Whittle, B.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Synthese
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0964
• Published Online: 26 September 2016
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2016 Springer
• First Published: First published in Synthese 194(12):5023-5037
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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