Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims

Harless, P. (2017) Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims. Economic Theory, 63(3), pp. 755-781. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-016-0960-9)

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Abstract

We propose and study a new axiom, restricted endowment additivity, for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. This axiom requires that awards be additively decomposable with respect to the endowment whenever no agent’s claim is filled. For two-claimant problems, restricted endowment additivity essentially characterizes weighted extensions of the proportional rule. With additional agents, however, the axiom is satisfied by a great variety of rules. Further imposing versions of continuity and consistency, we characterize a new family of rules which generalize the proportional rule. Defined by a priority relation and a weighting function, each rule aims, as nearly as possible, to assign awards within each priority class in proportion to these weights. We also identify important subfamilies and obtain new characterizations of the constrained equal awards and proportional rules based on restricted endowment additivity.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Harless, Dr Patrick
Authors: Harless, P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479
Published Online:01 March 2016
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2016 Springer-Verlag
First Published:First published in Economic Theory 63(3):755-781
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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