Defending a simple theory of conditionals

Rieger, A. (2015) Defending a simple theory of conditionals. American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(3), pp. 253-260.

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This paper extends the defense of a simple theory of indicative conditionals previously proposed by the author, in which the truth conditions are material, and Grice-style assertability conditions are given to explain the paradoxes of material implication. The paper discusses various apparent counter-examples to the material account in which conditionals are not asserted, and so the original theory cannot be applied; it is argued that, nevertheless, the material theory can be defended.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Rieger, Dr Adam
Authors: Rieger, A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:American Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:University of Illinois Press
ISSN (Online):2152-1123
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
First Published:First published in American Philosophical Quarterly 52(3): 253-260
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
516521Indicative ConditionalsAdam RiegerArts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)AH/H006230/1HU - PHILOSOPHY