Moulin, H. (2017) One-dimensional mechanism design. Theoretical Economics, 12(2), pp. 587-619. (doi: 10.3982/TE2307)
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Abstract
We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation proÖles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem ([10], [21]) and the division of a non disposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule ([48]). We construct a canonical peak-only rule equalizing in the leximin sense individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is ef- Öcient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric non disposable division problems.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Theoretical Economics |
Publisher: | Society for Economic Theory |
ISSN: | 1933-6837 |
ISSN (Online): | 1555-7561 |
Published Online: | 26 May 2017 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2017 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Theoretical Economics 12(2): 287-619 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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