Driesen, B. (2016) Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 46(4), pp. 777-809. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x)
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Abstract
We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (Econ Lett 73:131–136, 2001), and using methods of Imai (Econometrica 51:389–401, 1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Aside from standard axioms in the literature, this result involves a new property that weakens the axiom Bilateral Consistency (Lensberg, J Econ Theory 45:330–341, 1988), by making the notion of consistency dependent on how ideal values in a reduced problem change relative to the original problem.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Driesen, Dr Bram |
| Authors: | Driesen, B. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Sociology Anthropology and Applied Social Sciences |
| Journal Name: | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-217X |
| Published Online: | 09 December 2015 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg |
| First Published: | First published in Social Choice and Welfare 2015 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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