The limits of legal accountability of the European Central Bank

Goldoni, M. (2017) The limits of legal accountability of the European Central Bank. George Mason Law Review, 24(2), pp. 595-616.

Abstract

This article will focus on the state of legal accountability in the relation between the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the European Central Bank (“ECB”) as developed after the unfolding of the so-called Euro Crisis. The underlying hypothesis behind this analysis is twofold: the 2008 crisis has marked a remarkable change in the constitutional balance of the Eurozone, and as a consequence the constitutional function of the ECB has emerged and become visible. To detect these changes, three cases will be discussed in order to show that there has been a shift in the ECJ’s interpretation of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (“the Treaties”)1 and, accordingly, of the role of the ECB. The reaction to the Euro crisis has shown that the ECB cannot be deemed to be only an administrative independent agency, but it should be treated as an organ with constitutional functions, whose role has systemic implications for the stability of the European Union itself.2 Such recognition implies that the ECB’s decisions ought to be treated not only procedurally, but in a genuinely political and constitutional way.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Goldoni, Professor Marco
• Authors: Goldoni, M.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Law
• Journal Name: George Mason Law Review
• Publisher: George Mason Law Journal Association, George Mason University School of Law
• ISSN: 1088-5625
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2017 George Mason Law Journal Association, George Mason University School of Law
• First Published: First published in George Mason Law Review 24(2):595-616
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced with the permission of the publisher.