Cowan, R. (2016) Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(1), pp. 59-81. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2015.1123037)
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Abstract
Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can (and do) sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view in value theory – Neo-Sentimentalism – according to which values are analysed in terms of fitting emotions.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Cowan, Dr Robert |
| Authors: | Cowan, R. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Taylor and Francis |
| ISSN: | 0045-5091 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1911-0820 |
| Published Online: | 05 January 2016 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
| First Published: | First published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(1): 59-81 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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