Constrained efficiency without commitment

Martins-da-Rocha, V. F. and Vailakis, Y. (2015) Constrained efficiency without commitment. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61, pp. 276-286. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.010)

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We consider an infinite horizon economy where agents share income risks by trading a complete set of contingent claims but cannot commit to their promises. Allocations are restricted to be self-enforcing relative to autarchic reservation utilities. We provide a general characterization of constrained Pareto efficiency without assuming that there are uniform gains to trade. Our results extend those in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) in several aspects.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Vailakis, Professor Yiannis
Authors: Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., and Vailakis, Y.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Mathematical Economics
Publisher:Elsevier B.V.
ISSN (Online):1873-1538
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V.
First Published:First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 61:276-286
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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