Martins-da-Rocha, V. F. and Vailakis, Y. (2015) Constrained efficiency without commitment. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61, pp. 276-286. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.010)
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Abstract
We consider an infinite horizon economy where agents share income risks by trading a complete set of contingent claims but cannot commit to their promises. Allocations are restricted to be self-enforcing relative to autarchic reservation utilities. We provide a general characterization of constrained Pareto efficiency without assuming that there are uniform gains to trade. Our results extend those in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) in several aspects.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Vailakis, Professor Yiannis |
| Authors: | Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., and Vailakis, Y. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1873-1538 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. |
| First Published: | First published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 61:276-286 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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