Pushing Wittgenstein and Quine closer together

Kemp, G. (2014) Pushing Wittgenstein and Quine closer together. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 2(10),

Abstract

As against the view represented here by Peter Hacker and John Canfield, I urge that the philosophies of Quine and Wittgenstein can be reconciled. Both replace the orthodox view of language as resting on reference: Quine with the notion of linguistic disposition, Wittgenstein with the notions of grammar and forms of life. I argue that Wittgenstein's insistence, in the rule-following discussion, that at bottom these are matters of practice, of ‘what we do’, is not only compatible in a rough sort of way with Quine's outlook, but is very close to Quine's naturalistic view of language. And I argue that the likely objections to this can on the one hand be explained away as Quine's having been interested in a very narrow slice of language in comparison with Wittgenstein, and on the other by a failure to take into account later developments in Quine’s views.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kemp, Dr Gary
• Authors: Kemp, G.
• College/School: College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy
• Publisher: New Prairie Press
• ISSN: 2159-0303