Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation

Manlove, D. and O'Malley, G. (2014) Paired and altruistic kidney donation in the UK: Algorithms and experimentation. Journal of Experimental Algorithmics, 19(2), 2.6. (doi:10.1145/2670129)

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Abstract

We study the computational problem of identifying optimal sets of kidney exchanges in the UK. We show how to expand an integer programming-based formulation due to Roth et al. [2007] in order to model the criteria that constitute the UK definition of optimality. The software arising from this work has been used by the National Health Service Blood and Transplant to find optimal sets of kidney exchanges for their National Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes since July 2008. We report on the characteristics of the solutions that have been obtained in matching runs of the scheme since this time. We then present empirical results arising from experiments on the real datasets that stem from these matching runs, with the aim of establishing the extent to which the particular optimality criteria that are present in the UK influence the structure of the solutions that are ultimately computed. A key observation is that allowing four-way exchanges would be likely to lead to a moderate number of additional transplants.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:© ACM, 2014. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Journal of Experimental Algorithmics 19(2):2.6, 2014. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2670129
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Dr David and O'Malley, Dr Gregg
Authors: Manlove, D., and O'Malley, G.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Journal Name:Journal of Experimental Algorithmics
Publisher:Association for Computing Machinery
ISSN:1084-6654
ISSN (Online):1084-6654
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2014 ACM
First Published:First published in Journal of Experimental Algorithmics 19(2):2.6
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE