Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auction Models Credible? Semi & Nonparametric Scrutinizations

Chernomaz, K. and Yoshimoto, H. (2014) Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auction Models Credible? Semi & Nonparametric Scrutinizations. Working Paper. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

Chernomaz, K. and Yoshimoto, H. (2014) Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auction Models Credible? Semi & Nonparametric Scrutinizations. Working Paper. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Structural first-price auction estimation methods, built upon Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), have provided prolific empirical findings. However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the assumption of BNE is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that evokes harsh criticism on the literature. To respond to skepticism regarding credibility, we provide a focused answer by scrutinizing estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data in which researchers observe valuations. We test the statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, strongly supporting the credibility of structural asymmetric auction estimates.

Item Type:Research Reports or Papers (Working Paper)
Status:Unpublished
Refereed:No
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Yoshimoto, Dr Hisayuki
Authors: Chernomaz, K., and Yoshimoto, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2014 The Authors
Publisher Policy:Reproduced with the permission of the authors

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