The problem of universals and the limits of truth-making

MacBride, F. (2002) The problem of universals and the limits of truth-making. Philosophical Papers, 31(1), pp. 27-37. (doi:10.1080/05568640209485093)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640209485093

Abstract

There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity must first be drawn before a sentence is eligible to be supplied with truth-makers. The case is made through a consideration of a recent argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macbride, Professor Fraser
Authors: MacBride, F.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Papers
Publisher:Taylor and Francis (Routledge)
ISSN:0556-8641
ISSN (Online):1996-8523

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record