Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools

Cechlárová, K., Fleiner, T., Manlove, D. F., McBride, I. and Potpinková, E. (2015) Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 23(3), pp. 547-562. (doi:10.1007/s10100-014-0356-5)

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Abstract

Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for assigning students to study places or fresh graduates to their first positions. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning trainee teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by the situation characteristic for Slovak and Czech education system where each pre-service teacher specializes in two subjects. We show that if the two subjects can be performed independently in two different schools, then a feasible assignment can be found efficiently by employing network flow techniques. By contrast, the requirement to perform both subjects at the same school leads to intractable problems even under several strict restrictions concerning the total number of subjects, partial capacities of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list. Finally, we report on an integer programming model for solving the ‘inseparable subjects’ case of the teachers assignment problem and the results of its application to real data.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Dr David
Authors: Cechlárová, K., Fleiner, T., Manlove, D. F., McBride, I., and Potpinková, E.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Journal Name:Central European Journal of Operations Research
Publisher:Springer Berlin Heidelberg
ISSN:1435-246X
ISSN (Online):1613-9178
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2015 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
First Published:First published in Central European Journal of Operations Research
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE