Hyperintensional truth conditions (reply to Ian Rumfitt)

Kemp, G. (2014) Hyperintensional truth conditions (reply to Ian Rumfitt). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88(1), pp. 57-68. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00232.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00232.x

Abstract

A response to certain parts of Rumfitt (2014): I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Publisher:The Aristotelian Society
ISSN:0309-7013

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